The current section of the “Analysis” series covers KPI Green Energy Ltd previously known as KPI Global Infrastructure Ltd, active in renewable energy space. The company installs solar power plants both for itself as an independent power producer (IPP) as well as a contractor (engineering, procurement and construction, EPC) for other entities under its captive power plant (CPP) vertical. Recently, the company started installing hybrid power plants containing both solar and wind power plants.
Please note that to get maximum benefit from this article; an investor should focus on the analysis process instead of looking for good or bad aspects of the company. She should learn the interpretation of diverse types of data and transactions and pay attention to the parts of annual reports etc. used to get the information. This will help her in improving her stock analysis skills.
KPI Green Energy Ltd: Detailed Fundamental Analysis
KPI Green Energy Ltd has investments in various subsidiaries. As a result, KPI Green Energy Ltd reports both standalone as well as consolidated financials.
On September 30, 2024, the company had 5 subsidiaries that are included in its consolidated results. (Q2-FY2025 results announcement, page 2).
- KPI Green Energy Limited
- KPIG Energia Private Limited
- Sun Drops Energia Private Limited
- KPark Sunbeat Private Limited
- Miyani Power Infra LLP
We believe that while analysing any company, an investor should always look at the company as a whole and focus on financials, which represent the business picture of the entire company including its subsidiaries, joint ventures etc. Consolidated financials of a company present such a picture. Therefore, if a company reports both standalone as well as consolidated financials, then the investor should prefer the analysis of the consolidated financials of the company.
As a result, while analysing the past financial performance of KPI Green Energy Ltd, we have analysed its standalone financials until FY2019 and consolidated financials from FY2020 onwards from when it started reporting consolidated financials.
Further recommended reading: Standalone vs Consolidated Financials: A Complete Guide
With this background, let us analyse the financial performance of KPI Green Energy Ltd.


Financial and Business Analysis of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
In the last 10 years (FY2015-FY2024), the sales of KPI Green Energy Ltd have increased by 76% year on year, from ₹6 cr in FY2015 to ₹1,024 cr in FY2024. Moreover, in the 12 months ended September 30, 2024 (i.e. Oct. 2023-Sept 2024), the company reported a further growth of its sales to ₹1,327 cr.
However, over the years, the operating profit margin (OPM) of KPI Green Energy Ltd has seen large fluctuations between 13% to 68%. The OPM was 13% in FY2015, improved significantly to 68% in FY2017 and then declined to 45% in FY2019. Thereafter, the OPM increased to 57% in FY2021 and then declined to 32% in FY2023. In the 12 months ended September 30, 2024 (i.e. Oct. 2023-Sept 2024), the company reported an OPM of 35%.
The net profit margin (NPM) of KPI Green Energy Ltd has shown similar fluctuations from 6% to 32% during the last 10 years (FY2015-FY2024). In the 12 months ended September 30, 2024 (i.e. Oct. 2023-Sept 2024), the company reported an NPM of 17%.
To understand the reasons for business growth of KPI Green Energy Ltd along with fluctuations in its profit margins, an investor needs to read the publicly available documents of the company like its annual reports, red herring prospectus (RHP) for its initial public offer (IPO) in FY2019, prospectus for its subsequent qualified institutional placements (QIP), conference call transcript, credit rating reports by CRISIL, CARE, ICRA and Acuite and its corporate announcements submitted to stock exchanges.
In addition, an investor should also read the following article on conducting business analysis of solar and wind power plant manufacturers:
The above-mentioned documents show that the following key factors have influenced the business of KPI Green Energy Ltd, which are critical to understanding for any investor.
1) Significant increase in the scale of operations by KPI Green Energy Ltd:
Initially, the main source of income for the company was selling plots of land. The company used to buy/aggregate land on which it would construct solar power plants and then it would sell these plots to different investors and then lease them back and pay lease rent to these investors. The proceeds from the sale of plots would constitute its income and the lease rent payments would constitute expenses.
FY2017 annual report, page 24:


In FY2017, the company completed its first solar power plant of 3.48 MW and started earning revenue from the sale of electricity.
FY2017 annual report, page 12:
company has completed erection and commissioning of 3.48 MW solar plant. the company has started generation of Electric Power from the solar plant and earned revenue from the sale of the said power.
Thereafter, the company shifted its focus from the sale of plots to the construction of solar power plants and every year commissioned more power plants leading to a sharp increase in revenue from the sale of electricity.
The following chart indicates how the number of electricity units produced by KPI Green Energy Ltd has increased from 0.02 cr units in FY2016 to 21.26 cr units in FY2024.


During this period, the company has increased its power plant capacity multifold. From about 3.5 MW in FY2017 to more than 500 MW by September 30, 2024, comprising 171 MW of owned solar power plants (independent power producer, IPP) and 366 MW of power plants installed for other customers (EPC contracts, captive power plants, CPP division).
Investor presentation, Q2-FY2025 results, page 4:


As a result of this increase in scale of business by KPI Green Energy Ltd, it has achieved a sales growth of 76% year on year in the last 10 years (FY2015-FY2024).
Also read: How to do Business Analysis of a Company
2) Lack of pricing power of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
The power sector including the renewable power sector is a highly competitive field where the price of electricity is determined via auctions/bidding in which aggressive bidding by power producers keeps pushing the prices lower.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, page 93:
The renewable energy sector is highly competitive, with numerous players vying for market share.
Due to intense competition and technological advancements, the price/tariff of solar power has declined sharply from over ₹12 per unit to about ₹2.5 per unit in the recent past.
Red herring prospectus (RHP) for IPO, December 2018, page 100:


As electricity power is a commodity i.e. a customer can use electricity from any source like thermal, hydro, solar, wind, nuclear etc. without any impact on its operations; therefore, the price of power that any solar plant including KPI Green Energy Ltd can get is highly dependent on what price other competitors are providing.
As a result, the price of power that KPI Green Energy Ltd can get from its customers is not related to what it costs for the company to produce the power.
Red herring prospectus (RHP) for IPO, December 2018, page 32:
The price at which electricity can be sold depends on a rate at which electricity is sold by other competitors including players generating power from other than solar…Therefore, the prices at which we supply power may have little or no relationship with the costs incurred in generating power.
As a result of the commodity nature of its business, KPI Green Energy Ltd is not able to pass on any increase in its operating costs to its customers who prefer to enter into a fixed price PPA (power purchase agreement). Fixed revenue with variable operating costs like interest costs, leads to fluctuations in its profit margins.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, pages 47 and 55:
We enter into fixed-price EPCC contracts with most of our customers…It is unlikely that we would be able to renegotiate the terms of existing PPAs to take advantage any increase in tariffs or increased operational costs…which may lead to fluctuations in our margins. The above factors limit our business flexibility and expose us to an increased risk of unforeseen business and industry changes
Credit rating report by ICRA, March 2024, page 4:
the debt coverage metrics of the Group remain exposed to interest rate movement, given the fixed tariff under the PPA.
Therefore, an investor should keep in mind that despite the increasing business size of the company, it is highly unlikely that KPI Green Energy Ltd will get pricing power over its customers because its customers can easily switch sources of electricity power without any impact on their business operations.
As a result, KPI Green Energy Ltd will always be a price taker where the price of electricity sold by it will depend on what its competitors are willing to supply to the market.
Also read: How to analyse New Companies in Unknown Industries?
3) Steps taken by KPI Green Energy Ltd to reduce costs, and improve its efficiency and profit margins:
As the company cannot increase its prices to its customers; therefore, it focuses on reducing its costs of operations as well as improving its operating efficiency in order to increase its profit margins.
KPI Green Energy Ltd has implemented solar sun tracking technology in its solar plants, which helps the solar panels to direct themselves towards the sun as the day progresses. This helps the solar panels to capture more sunlight and increases power production leading to improved efficiency by 15-20%.
FY2024 annual report, page 96:
We have implemented the Solar Sun tracking system technology in our Solar projects to enhance generation efficiency by approximately 15-20% without requiring additional land or plant capacity.
Similarly, the company has installed bifacial solar panels, which capture light from both (front and rear) side of the solar panel and increase the amount of electricity production.
FY2023 annual report, page 17:
By introducing bifacial solar panels that capture sunlight from both the front and rear sides, we have achieved significantly higher energy yields.
One of the major costs of operation and maintenance (O&M) of solar power plants is regular cleaning of solar panels. Otherwise, a continuous deposition of dust on the panels reduces their power generation efficiency. The cleaning of solar panels used to be a labour-intensive process that used to consume a lot of water.
KPI Green Energy Ltd has implemented a waterless robotic system for cleaning solar panels, which has improved energy generation and reduced impact on the environment.
FY2023 annual report, page 17:
adopting of water-less robotic cleaning of solar panels has streamlined maintenance operations, increased cleaning frequency saved huge amount of cleaning water and mitigated risks associated with manual labour at elevated heights…enhanced our efficiency
Apart from adopting the above-mentioned steps to improve operating efficiency, the company has taken financial steps to reduce costs like switching debt from a lender charging a higher interest rate to the one providing a lower interest rate.
For example, in FY2022, the company refinanced ₹178 cr of debt from Power Finance Corporation (PFC) at an interest rate of 11.30% to State Bank of India (SBI) at an interest rate of 7.45%, which had the potential of savings of about ₹6.8 cr per year (=178 cr * (11.30% – 7.45%)).
Also read: How to study Annual Report of a Company
4) Product mix of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
The company primarily operates in two segments: First, independent power producer (IPP) where it owns the power plant and produces and sells power to customers. The IPP segment has high operating profit margins of 85-90% because once the power plant is completed, then the solar panels keep on generating power from sunlight without consuming any raw material. The major cost of running the power plant is its maintenance cost, which is very low.
Conference call transcript, Nov. 2024, page 9:
Salim Yahoo: IPP adds to the bottomline, because IPP margins, EBITDA margins are very high. So, if you look at my GUVNL projects, my EBITDA margin in IPP would be around 85% to 90%. Because after I set up the plant, there is no other cost other than the only O&M cost which is very nominal.
The second segment is captive power plants (CPP) where KPI Green Energy Ltd builds and sells the solar power plant to its customers. In CPP, the company acts like an EPC contractor. This segment has a lower profit margin than the IPP segment.
In the past, whenever the contribution of the CPP segment in the overall sales increased, then the company witnessed its profit margins decline.
For example, in FY2022 and FY2023, the OPM of the company declined from 57% in FY2021 to 32% in FY2023 primarily due to a higher contribution from the CPP segment.
Credit rating report by ICRA, May 2023, page 2:
The OPM moderated YoY owing to the higher contribution of the CPP segment to the revenue, which has a lower margin compared to the IPP segment.
In H1-FY2025, the CPP segment constituted about 87.9% of the overall revenues of KPI Green Energy Ltd.
Investor presentation, Q2-FY2025 results, page 15:


Before IPO, most of the revenue of the company was due to the sale of plots of land, which was a very high-margin business. As a result, until FY2018, the company enjoyed a very high OPM of 59-68%, which declined subsequently to about 45%, as the company shifted its focus to IPP and CPP activities.
FY2019 annual report, page 86:
operating margin declined compared to last year as in previous years it was driven by sale of plots, whereas in 2018-19 the revenue was driven by more sustainable model of sale of power & EPC of solar plant. The margin in these businesses are lower compared to plot sale
Also read: Credit Rating Reports: A Complete Guide for Stock Investors
5) Risks in the business model of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
5.1) Regulatory risk:
Solar as well as wind power generation sectors are highly regulated and as a result among the risks faced by the companies in these sectors, regulatory risk is one of the biggest risks.
Govt. gives many taxation incentives to renewable power producers, which makes their operations profitable despite low tariffs.
Red herring prospectus (RHP) for IPO, December 2018, page 91:
section 80-IA of the Act…deduction of 100% of the profits and gains derived from power generation for a period of 10 consecutive years out of 15 years beginning the year in which the unit begins power generation.
Govt. also allows benefits of accelerated depreciation to solar power projects, which helps it to prepone recovery of its capital expenses by deferring tax payments.
Red herring prospectus (RHP) for IPO, December 2018, page 30:
Government of India had provided acceleration depreciation benefit at the rate of 80% on the book value of a solar power plant. However in the union budget of 2016-17, the government reduced it to 40%
Govt. also allows banks to treat loans to solar power projects as priority sector lending, which reduces the interest cost of renewable power projects.
FY2021 annual report, page 77:
Renewable energy projects are included in priority sector lending, which is relatively cheaper than other sources of credit.
If there is any change in govt. policy regarding such tax incentives, then it can seriously impact the profitability and viability of solar power projects.
For example, in Gujarat Solar Power Policy 2021, the govt. imposed a banking charge of ₹1.50 per unit and increased a cross-subsidy surcharge, which led to lower net realization for solar power projects.
Credit rating report by ICRA, January 2022, pages 2-3:
Under the new Gujarat Solar Power Policy 2021, the net realisations have lowered owing to the introduction of banking charges of Rs. 1.50/unit and the increase in the cross-subsidy surcharge.
Moreover, the company faces a higher regulatory risk because currently, almost all of its functional projects are in the state of Gujarat. Therefore, any adverse change in regulations by Gujarat will significantly impact the company.
Credit rating report by ICRA, May 2023, page 3:
Group has the entire capacity (IPP+CPP) in Gujarat, the geographical concentration risk amplifies the regulatory risk arising from any adverse policy change in the state
Other govt. initiatives like 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) under automatic route increase the competition for Indian players as foreign players can easily enter the market.
Also read: How To Monitor Stocks In Your Portfolio
5.2) Social and environmental risks:
Solar power projects require large land parcels for installation. As a result, companies have to buy big land parcels from farmers etc. In India, land acquisition is a very politically sensitive issue and leads to a lot of social and regulatory risks for companies.
Credit rating report by ICRA, May 2023, page 3:
given the large land requirement for RE projects, social risks manifest when there are disagreements on compensation between the developers and landowners.
FY2023 annual report, page 133:
Securing land for the construction of transmission lines connecting solar power plants to the grid has ushered in numerous challenges.
Companies also face risks under environmental regulations due to the involvement of large land parcels. In 2024, KPI Green Energy Ltd was impacted when the Honorable Supreme Court of India ordered the shifting of overhead powerlines to underground to protect endangered birds.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, page 68:
The recent order of the Supreme Court directing shifting of existing overhead powerlines underground in certain environmentally protected areas might adversely impact our business and operations of some of our Subsidiaries…conservation of two critically endangered species of birds, the Great Indian Bustard and the Lesser Florican
The promoters of the company face criminal complaints under environmental regulations due to alleged damages to the environment.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, page 272:
Gujarat Pollution Control Board (“Complainant”) filed a criminal complaint against, inter-alia, our Promoters and Directors, namely, Farukbhai Gulambhai Patel…for violation of punishable offenses under the Environment Protection Act, 1986. The compliant, inter-alia, alleged…destruction of mangroves and Asiatic animals.
5.3) Seasonal/climatic risks:
Solar power generation depends on the amount of sunlight received by solar panels. As a result, whenever there is low sunlight due to cloud cover in monsoon/rains or shorter days in winter, the power generation falls.
For example, the power plants of KPI Green Energy Ltd were impacted in FY2020 due to heavy rains.
Credit rating report by CARE, February 2020, page 1:
performance during 10MFY20 was lower than FY19 on account of planned outages due to upgradation activity and heavy rains
Similarly, in FY2022, the company was affected due to extended monsoons.
Credit rating report by ICRA, January 2022, page 3:
KPIGIL’s PLF levels in 6M FY2022 stood lower with an average PLF of ~16.4% due to the extended monsoon compared with an average PLF of 19.25% in FY2021.
In addition, as solar panels are exposed to natural elements, events like thunderstorms, hurricanes etc. can also damage solar panels.
Heavy Rains Wreak Havoc in Madhya Pradesh, Damage a 250 MW Solar Project
5.4) Risks in the power purchase agreements (PPA) signed by KPI Green Energy Ltd:
The PPAs signed by the company are not binding for long tenure and parties can cancel them by providing six months to one year notice. In the absence of long-term binding agreements, during an economic downturn, the company might end up with idle solar power plants without any buyer for electricity.
Credit rating report by ICRA, January 2022, page 2:
The cash flows from the IPP segment are susceptible to PPA termination by the existing clients, given the weak exit clause of the agreements. The PPAs can be terminated by either party after giving a notice of six months/one year.
In addition, the PPAs are for a duration shorter than the life of the power plant. As a result, even if the customers do not cancel the PPAs, still, after the end of the current PPAs, the company faces pricing risk at the time of renewal.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, page 55:
Our PPAs are generally for a term of 18 years, which is less than the life of the power projects to which they are tied…seek renewals or extensions of the existing PPAs, for the remaining duration of those power projects.
In order to mitigate the risk of clients exiting the existing PPAs, the company follows the practice of entering into PPAs in excess of its existing power generation capacity. As a result, the company faces the risk of not being able to provide power to customers when the customer demands it.
Credit rating report by ICRA, March 2024, page 3:
Group has a practice of entering into additional PPAs over and above the installed IPP capacities…The total PPAs entered into by the Group (including subsidiaries) stand at ~180 MW against the total installed capacity of ~137 MW.
5.5) Change in technology risk:
The world has seen rapid advancements in the technology for solar power generation. As a result of new technology, the price of solar modules has declined rapidly leading to a decline in the prices of solar power.
From 2016 to 2023, the prices of solar modules declined from $0.64 per watt to $0.19 per watt.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, page 130:


In such situations when technological changes make newer solar power plants highly efficient and their power much cheaper than older solar power plants, the customers of older power plants tend to force them to reduce their prices or unilaterally cancel the agreement, which hurts the profitability and recovery of investments done by older power plants.
Rating Methodology for Solar Power Producers by ICRA, July 2021 page 7:
While the PPAs are contractual documents, instances of attempts to re-negotiate the PPA terms unilaterally have been seen recently, resulting in prolonged legal & regulatory proceedings.
Therefore, in industries with rapidly changing technology, companies that are currently earning high prices cannot stay assured of continued high prices.
An investor may read an example of how a company in the solar power industry had to write off huge sums of money spent on creating manufacturing plants when rapidly changing technology made existing plants, even those created only a couple of years back, as economically unviable leading to large losses for lenders as well as shareholders: Analysis: Websol Energy System Ltd
Going ahead, an investor should keep a close watch on the regulatory developments as well as technological advancements related to the renewable power industry as these have the potential to significantly impact the business model of the company.
Over the years, the tax payout ratio of KPI Green Energy Ltd has been in line with the standard corporate tax rate in India. In FY2018, the company had a lower tax payout ratio, which was primarily due to timing differences in recognition of depreciation (RHP for IPO, Dec 2018, page 195).
Operating Efficiency Analysis of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
a) Net fixed asset turnover (NFAT) of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
Over the years, the NFAT of the company had stayed around 1 or less. This level of NFAT indicates that the company needs to invest comparatively much larger money in its assets to generate sales. When an investor analyses manufacturing companies, then she would note that most of the manufacturing companies have an NFAT in the range of 2.5 to 4.
Therefore, the business operations of KPI Green Energy Ltd are highly capital intensive.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, page 95:
Power project construction is a capital-intensive activity
Due to its highly capital-intensive business model, the company has been always on the lookout for funds.
The company raised its first FDI in 2018 when it raised ₹13.61 cr from Raisonneur Capital Ltd. and Aspire Emerging Fund. (FY2018 annual report, page 14).
Thereafter, for its first 25MW project, which cost about ₹132 cr, it raised debt of ₹86 cr from PFC and raised about ₹40 cr from its IPO in FY2019. (RHP for IPO, Dec. 2018, pages 18, 38, 76 and 77).
Since then, the company has raised a large amount of debt. Its total debt increased from about ₹0.7 cr in FY2015 to ₹1,036 cr in FY2024.
Due to high debt levels, the lenders asked the promoters to pledge their shareholding in the company to them as additional security. As a result, on Sept 30, 2024, 45.5% of the promoters’ stake in the company is pledged to lenders as a security for the loans taken by the company. (Corporate announcement to BSE, Sept 30, 2024).
In order to keep its leverage under control, the company diluted its equity in quick succession by raising two rounds of qualified institutional placement (QIP): December 2023: ₹300 cr and August 2024: ₹1,000 cr.
However, due to a highly capital-intensive business model, the company’s management clarified in its conference call in Nov. 2024 that the company will keep on raising more debt to build its solar power projects.
Conference call transcript, Nov. 2024, page 8:
Salim Yahoo:…So, there will be a debt which will come, but it will come in a phase-wise manner. But one thing I can assure you, that our debt to equity will never go beyond 2:1.
Going ahead, an investor should monitor the NFAT of KPI Green Energy Ltd to understand whether it is able to improve its asset utilization efficiently and whether it is able to keep its debt levels under control without further equity dilution.
Further advised reading: Asset Turnover Ratio: A Complete Guide for Investors
b) Inventory turnover ratio (ITR) of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
Over the years, the ITR of KPI Green Energy Ltd has improved from 3.2 in FY2017 to 4.1 in FY2024. An improvement in the inventory turnover ratio indicates that the company is able to utilize its inventory more efficiently.
However, the ITR of the company witnessed a significant decline in FY2020 and FY2021 when it reached levels of 2.4 and 2.7 respectively. This was primarily due to a higher share of the EPC segment (captive power plants, CPP) in the business of the company because the EPC business is working capital intensive and requires a large amount of inventory holding.
Credit rating report by ICRA, January 2021, page 2:
KPIGIL’s working capital intensity remains high due to high inventory and debtor levels in the EPC projects.
Credit rating report by CARE, February 2020, page 3:
working capital cycle during FY19 elongated to 208 days primarily on account of increase in inventory level owing to the ongoing power projects and receivables under CPP model.
Nevertheless, in recent years, KPI Green Energy Ltd has improved its inventory utilization efficiency as its ITR has improved to 4.1 in FY2024.
Going ahead, an investor should monitor the inventory position of KPI Green Energy Ltd to assess whether it is able to manage its inventory efficiently.
Further advised reading: Inventory Turnover Ratio: A Complete Guide
c) Analysis of receivables days of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
Over the years, the receivables days of KPI Green Energy Ltd have increased from 30 days in FY2016 to 102 days in FY2024.
Receivables days increased significantly to about 140 days in FY2019 and FY2021, indicating that the company was facing challenges in getting its money from its customers on time. It was primarily because the company had to provide a longer credit period to its customers.
Credit rating report by Acuite, October 2021, page 2:
The debtor’s days were recorded at 176 days for FY2021 as against 175 days in FY2020 due to the billing system followed in the IPP and CPP segments.
The business of KPI Green Energy Ltd is highly working capital intensive because the company has to give a longer credit period to its customers than what it receives from its suppliers. As a result, a lot of its money gets blocked in inventory and receivables leading to a high working capital debt.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, pages 43-44:
The credit period offered by our business partners and suppliers is generally lesser than what we generally grant our customers
Our business of providing O&M services to all our CPP projects requires a significant amount of working capital as there is considerable time lag between purchase of raw materials and realization from sale of our finished goods
Going ahead, an investor should watch the trend of receivables days of KPI Green Energy Ltd to assess whether it continues to collect its receivables on time.
Further recommended reading: Receivable Days: A Complete Guide
When an investor compares the cumulative net profit after tax (cPAT) and cumulative cash flow from operations (cCFO) of KPI Green Energy Ltd for FY2015-FY2024, then she notices that over the years (FY2015-FY2024), the company is not able to convert its profit into cash flow from operations.
Over FY2015-24, KPI Green Energy Ltd reported a total net profit after tax (cPAT) of ₹375 cr. During the same period, it reported cumulative cash flow from operations (cCFO) of ₹240 cr.
It is advised that investors should read the article on CFO calculation, which would help them understand the situations in which companies tend to have the CFO lower than their PAT. In addition, the investors would also understand the situations when the companies would have their CFO higher than PAT.
Further recommended reading: Understanding Cash Flow from Operations (CFO)
Learning from the article on CFO and the fund flow analysis over the last 10 years will show to an investor that the company could not convert its profits into CFO as over FY2015-FY2024, incremental inventory requirements consumed ₹316 cr and increased receivables requirements consumed ₹427 cr of its funds.
Going ahead, an investor should keep a close watch on the working capital position of KPI Green Energy Ltd.
The Margin of Safety in the Business of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
a) Self-Sustainable Growth Rate (SSGR):
Read: Self Sustainable Growth Rate: a measure of Inherent Growth Potential of a Company
Upon reading the SSGR article, an investor would appreciate that if a company is growing at a rate equal to or less than the SSGR and it can convert its profits into cash flow from operations, then it would be able to fund its growth from its internal resources without the need of external sources of funds.
Conversely, if any company attempts to grow its sales at a rate higher than its SSGR, then its internal resources would not be sufficient to fund its growth aspirations. As a result, the company would have to rely on additional sources of funds like debt or equity dilution to meet the cash requirements to generate its target growth.
An investor may calculate the SSGR using the following formula:
SSGR = NFAT * NPM * (1-DPR) – Dep
Where,
- SSGR = Self Sustainable Growth Rate in %
- Dep = Depreciation rate as a % of net fixed assets
- NFAT = Net fixed asset turnover (Sales/average net fixed assets over the year)
- NPM = Net profit margin as % of sales
- DPR = Dividend paid as % of net profit after tax
(For systematic algebraic calculation of SSGR formula: Click Here)
An investor would notice that over the years, KPI Green Energy Ltd had reported an SSGR of 2-12% whereas over the last 10 years (FY2015-FY2024), it has grown its sales at a rate of 76% year on year. As a result, the company has grown its sales at a rate higher than what its business profits can sustain.
Therefore, as discussed above, in the last 10 years (FY2015-FY2024), KPI Green Energy Ltd has had to raise a significant amount of additional funds by incremental debt and equity dilution (FDI, QIPs etc.).
The investor gets the same conclusion when she analyses the free cash flow position of KPI Green Energy Ltd.
b) Free Cash Flow (FCF) Analysis of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
While looking at the cash flow performance of KPI Green Energy Ltd, an investor notices that during FY2015-FY2024, it generated cash flow from operations of ₹240 cr. During the same period, it made a capital expenditure of about ₹1,185 cr.
Therefore, during this period (FY2015-FY2024), KPI Green Energy Ltd had a negative free cash flow (FCF) of (₹945) cr (=240 – 1,185).
In addition, during this period, the company had a non-operating income of ₹18 cr and an interest expense of ₹203 cr. As a result, the company had a total negative free cash flow of (₹1,130) cr (= 945 + 18 – 203). Please note that the capitalized interest is already factored in as a part of the capex deducted earlier.
KPI Green Energy Ltd used incremental debt and equity dilution to meet this cash shortfall. Over FY2015-FY2024, the company raised money by:
- ₹1,036 cr as additional debt because the total debt of the company increased from ₹0.7 cr in FY2015 to ₹1,036.5 cr in FY2024
- Equity dilutions:
- ₹13.61 cr by FDI in FY2018
- ₹40 cr by IPO in FY2019
- ₹300 cr by QIP in Dec. 2023
- ₹1,000 cr by QIP in Aug. 2024
Due to aggressive growth beyond what its inherent business model can sustain, KPI Green Energy Ltd has to continuously rely on outside capital to fund its business expansion. As a result, its debt keeps on increasing at a very fast pace. Thereafter, in order to control its leverage, the company has to dilute equity to raise money to repay debt. In the recent most QIP of ₹1,000 cr in August 2024, the company has used it primarily to repay debt.
Credit rating report by ICRA, September 2024, page 1:
fund-raising of Rs. 1,000 crore by KPI Green through the qualified institutional placement (QIP) route in August 2024, which has been mainly utilised to prepay the entire outstanding debt under KPI Green.
In such a situation, when the company’s business is highly capital intensive and its profits are not able to meet its capital expenditure requirements leading to a reliance on debt and equity dilution; an investor notices a tricky situation that the company has paid about ₹15 cr as dividends to its shareholders. Whenever a company with a negative free cash flow relying on additional debt and equity, pays dividends, then it might mean that these dividends in the hands of shareholders are simply a pass on from the debt proceeds or equity issuances.
Going ahead, an investor should keep a close watch on the free cash flow generation by KPI Green Energy Ltd to understand whether the company is able to generate surplus cash from its business or keeps on relying on outside funds for growth.
Further recommended reading: Free Cash Flow: A Complete Guide to Understanding FCF
Self-Sustainable Growth Rate (SSGR) and free cash flow (FCF) are the main pillars of assessing the margin of safety in the business model of any company.
Further advised reading: 3 Simple Ways to Assess “Margin of Safety”: The Cornerstone of Stock Investing
Additional aspects of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
On analysing KPI Green Energy Ltd and after reading annual reports, credit rating reports and other public documents, an investor comes across certain other aspects of the company, which are important for any investor to know while making an investment decision.
1) Management Succession of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
KPI Green Energy Ltd was established by Mr Faruk G. Patel (age 52 years) who is currently, the chairman and managing director (CMD) of the company. He has four sons: Son(s) Mr Affan F. Patel, Mr Hassan F. Patel, Mr Mohmmad Umar F. Patel and Mr Mohmmad Ali F. Patel and two daughters: Ms Zuveriya M. Kadva and Ms Zara F. Patel. (RHP for IPO, Dec. 2018, page 151).
As per public sources (click here), one of his sons, Mr Affan Farukh Patel, is a whole-time director at a group company, KP Energy Ltd., his other son, Mr Hassan Farukh Patel, takes care of human resources for the KP Group and his son-in-law, Mr Muinulhaque Kadva, is a whole-time director at the group company, KP Green Engineering Ltd.
Due to presence of the next generation in the active role in the business when the founder promoter is still active shows signs of good succession planning. However, in such cases, an investor should look for signs of disputes among the younger generation whether they get along well with each other.
Presence of a well-thought-out management succession plan is essential in the case of promoter-run businesses as it provides for a smooth transition of leadership over the generations and provides continuity in the business operations of any company.
Further advised reading: How to do Management Analysis of Companies?
2) Related party transactions of KPI Green Energy Ltd with its promoters:
Over the years, the company has entered into numerous transactions with promoters and their companies. These transactions range from buying land from promoters, buying/selling goods from/to promoters’ companies, giving loans to promoters’ companies, giving guarantees/security for loans taken by promoters’ companies from other lenders, paying royalties to the promoter etc.
There have been instances where group companies have used KPI Green Energy Ltd as a banker i.e. taking loans and repaying them within the year. Also, there have been instances where the promoters have taken advance for selling land to the company and then give it back as if the deal for the underlying land between the promoter and the final land seller did not materialize.
Public investors including institutional as well as retail investors have raised their voice against such transactions both by voting against such resolutions in the annual general meeting (AGM) as well as pointing it out to the management in conference calls. However, the management has continued with the related party transactions.
Let us see some of the related party transactions of KPI Green Energy Ltd with its promoters and their companies.
2.1) Purchasing land from promoters:
KPI Green Energy Ltd has been consistently buying land from promoters. For example, in FY2024, the company purchased about 52 acres of land from its promoter Mr Farukh G Patel for about ₹126 cr by purchasing a company KPark Sunbeat Private Limited (KSPL) from him.
FY2024 annual report, pages 22 and 79:
Recent acquisitions, such as the 100% equity stake in KPark Sunbeat Private Limited, have added 52+ acres to our land bank as on March 31, 2024 and secured GETCO evacuation approval for ~100 MW
shares were allotted to Dr. Faruk G. Patel…as consideration for the acquisition…of KPark Sunbeat Private Limited. The total consideration for this acquisition was ₹1,26,07,92,245.70
In the past also, the company had been buying land from promoters/directors.
RHP for IPO, Dec. 2018, page 141:
Our Company has acquired land of apporximatelly of 33.11 acres amounting to Rs. 527.70 Lakhs for 5 MW, 10 MW projects from the Directors in past.
At the time of the IPO, part of the money was used to buy land from promoters.
RHP for IPO, Dec. 2018, page 26:
A portion of the proceeds of the Issue will be utilized for acquiring 78.99 acres of land amounting to ₹ 1,750.78 lakh from the Promoter, Directors, their relatives and certain other parties, upon which the Proposed Project is to be set up.
In recent times, almost every year, the company has been paying advance to the promoters for buying land. For example, in FY2024, KPI Green Energy Ltd paid an advance of ₹50 cr to its promoter, Mr Faruk G Patel for the purchase of land.
FY2024 annual report, page 255:


Such transactions might indicate a situation where promoters buy land from the market and then sell it to the company. If in such transactions, the promoters buy land at a cheaper price from the farmers/sellers and later on sell it to KPI Green Energy Ltd at a higher price, then it might lead to a shifting of economic value from public shareholders to the promoters.
On multiple occasions, the company paid an advance to buy property to its promoter in a year and in the next year, the advance was received back. For example, in FY2021, KPI Green Energy Ltd paid an advance of ₹2.66 cr to its promoter, Mr Faruk G Patel for the purchase of property and in the next year, FY2022, the money was received back.
FY2022 annual report, pages 209-210:


Such transactions might indicate a situation where the promoters use the money received from the company for acquiring land from farmers/sellers and in case the deal fails, then return the money to the company indicating that ultimately, KPI Green Energy Ltd might end up financing the whole transaction as well.
As per the QIP prospectus, in FY2024, the company has given an advance of ₹20.25 lakh to one “Arifa Salim Yahoo” who is mentioned as a relative of KMP (key managerial personnel). She seems to be related to Mr Salim Yahoo, the CFO of the company as his wife or daughter. Therefore, it might indicate that apart from promoters, the company is buying properties from its senior management as well.
QIP prospectus, August 2024, page 433:


As mentioned earlier, such transactions of purchasing land and property by the company from promoters/managers have the potential of shifting economic benefits from public shareholders to the promoters/managers. Therefore, investors should do deeper due diligence on such transactions.
2.2) Significant royalty payment by KPI Green Energy Ltd to its promoter, Mr Farukh G. Patel:
From FY2024 onwards, in addition to remuneration, the company has started paying a significant royalty to its promoter, Mr Farukh G. Patel. In FY2024, the company paid him a royalty of ₹20.4 cr.
FY2024 annual report, page 257:


This is in addition to the remuneration of ₹3.06 cr paid by the company to him for FY2024 (FY2024 annual report, page 256).
Also read: How to identify Promoters extracting Money via High Salaries
2.3) KPI Green Energy Ltd giving loans and guarantees/security to promoters’ group companies:
On numerous occasions, the company has given loans to promoters’ group companies like KP Energy Ltd and KP Green Engineering Pvt. Ltd (Formerly known as KP Buildcon Pvt. Ltd) etc.
At times, these companies have taken loans and repaid them within the same year i.e. in effect using KPI Green Energy Ltd as a lender/overdraft account from where they can take money whenever they need and repay it when the need is over.
For example, in FY2023, K P Buildcon Pvt. Ltd took a loan of ₹27 cr from the company and repaid ₹32 cr.
FY2023 annual report, page 282:


In addition, KPI Green Energy Ltd has been giving securities and guarantees for the loans taken by promoter group companies from lenders.
For example, at the time of the IPO, it had given security worth ₹31 cr as well as a guarantee for the loan taken by a promoter group company, KP Energy Ltd from SBI.
RHP for IPO, Dec. 2018, page 215:
charge amounting to ₹ 3,100.55 Lakh created by way of equitable mortgage over flats being owned by our Company .. and corporate guarantee provided against loan given by State Bank of India to one of our Group Companies, i.e. K.P. Energy Limited
On March 31, 2024, KPI Green Energy Ltd had given guarantees of about ₹82 cr for its group companies.
FY2024 annual report, page 148:


Moreover, in the AGM held on Sept 25, 2024, KPI Green Energy Ltd has taken approval to give loans or guarantees or security for loans taken by promoter group companies, KP Energy Ltd and KP Green Engineering Pvt. Ltd. for up to ₹300 cr to each of these companies. (i.e. total up to ₹600 cr). (FY2024 annual report, page 52 and corporate announcement to BSE on Sept 27, 2024, disclosing results of AGM pages 16 and 17).
An investor should be cautious when any company gives guarantees for the loans taken by promoter group companies from lenders because in case, the promoter group company is not able to repay its loan, then the lenders will recover the money from the company (guarantor), which effectively means that the public shareholders of the guarantor company would suffer the impact.
Also read: How Promoters benefit from Related Party Transactions
2.4) Purchases and sales of goods by KPI Green Energy Ltd from promoters’ group companies:
Over the years, the company has entered into numerous sale and purchase transactions with its promoters’ group companies like KP Energy Ltd and KP Green Engineering Pvt. Ltd (Formerly known as KP Buildcon Pvt. Ltd) etc.
For example, in FY2024, KPI Green Energy Ltd made purchases of about ₹147 cr from KP Energy Ltd and about ₹79 cr from KP Green Engineering Pvt. Ltd (₹39.19 cr + ₹39.78 cr).
FY2024 annual report, page 257:


In addition, it did sales of about ₹25 cr to related parties in FY2024.
FY2024 annual report, page 256:


In the past as well, KPI Green Energy Ltd has been indulging in such transactions with related parties on a regular basis.
In fact, in FY2023, the company sought approvals from shareholders for entering into related party transactions with promoters’ group companies like KP Energy Ltd and KP Green Engineering Pvt. Ltd for amounts exceeding legal limits.
FY2023 annual report, page 40:
aggregate value of all these transaction(s), whether undertaken directly by the Company or along with its subsidiary(ies), may exceed the prescribed thresholds as per the provisions of Listing Regulations as applicable from time to time
In their response, 100% of public institutions voted against these proposed resolutions in the AGM. However, the resolutions were approved as retail shareholders voted in favour of the resolutions.
Corporate announcement to BSE, Oct. 2, 2023, AGM results, page 8:


Now, the company has given large orders for its upcoming power plants to the promoters’ group company, KP Energy Ltd. In the conference call, investors questioned the management about its corporate governance regarding these orders given to KP Energy Ltd.
Conference call transcript, Q2-FY2025 results, Nov. 2024, page 10:
Drishtant:…in terms of the orders given to KP Energy. I mean, sir you obviously understand the importance of corporate governance in the market. And I just want to be sure that we’re definitely keeping everything in terms of corporate governance checks and balances
As mentioned earlier, an investor should be extra cautious while assessing companies that enter into large sale and purchase transactions with promoters’ related parties. This is because such transactions have the potential to shift economic benefits from minority shareholders to promoters if the company buys goods/services from the promoters’ entity at a price higher than the market price or sells goods/services to the promoters’ entity at a price lower than the market price.
It seems that despite being listed companies, promoters treat their group companies including KPI Green Energy Ltd as one single business using them to freely move money and material from one entity to another. This might be the reason that recently, the promoter group has appointed a Group CEO who would oversee the management of the entire group including KPI Green Energy Ltd and other promoters’ group companies.
Corporate announcement to BSE, Nov. 11, 2024, page 1:
KP Group has appointed Dr. Alok Das as the Group Chief Executive Officer (Group CEO)…his leadership will significantly contribute to the continued growth and success of KP Group.
An investor may note that when promoters have many group companies operating in similar businesses, then, at times, their decisions to make the best use of resources may not be in the best interests of minority shareholders of any particular company.
An investor may read the case of Linde India Ltd where its dealing with Praxair India after a merger at the global level led to a loss of business opportunities and in turn, benefits for the minority shareholders of the company. Recently, the Securities and Exchange Board of India ordered the company to refrain from it and asked the National Stock Exchange to assess the impact of the loss of business opportunities for shareholders of Linde India Ltd due to its related party transactions with Praxair India.
Read: Analysis: Linde India Ltd
3) Accounting assumptions by KPI Green Energy Ltd:
On certain occasions, the company had made certain accounting assumptions, which require investors to make adjustment to accurately understand its financial data.
For example, in the FY2020 annual report, the company disclosed a part of the debt as an inflow under cash flow from operating activities (CFO).
In the CFO calculations, the company showed an inflow of about ₹10.79 cr as an increase in other current liabilities.
FY2020 annual report, page 111:


In the detailed note on “other current liabilities”, an investor notices that the inflow of ₹10.79 cr is due to an increase in liabilities to ₹18.25 cr in FY2024 over ₹7.45 cr in FY2023. However, almost all of this increase is due to the current maturity of long-term debt, primarily an increase in the debt from Power Finance Corporation of ₹7.97 cr and from SBI short-term loan of 3.83 cr.
FY2020 annual report, page 120:


Therefore, the CFO for the year FY2020 contains about ₹10.79 cr on account of debt and not due to operating activities.
Also read: How Companies Manipulate Cash Flow from Operating Activities (CFO)
On another occasion, in FY2021, under trade payables (creditors), the company showed negative outstanding under sundry creditors for plot and land.
FY2021 annual report, page 99:


An investor would note that negative trade payables mean that instead of paying money, the company has to collect money from these counterparties. In such a case, this money becomes a loan or advance i.e. an asset instead of a liability, which should be shown on the asset side of the balance sheet.
Therefore, at times, the accounting assumptions used by KPI Green Energy Ltd make it necessary for the investors to make adjustments to understand the correct financial position.
Also read: 7 Signs to tell whether a Company is cooking its Books: “Financial Shenanigans”
4) Weakness in internal controls and processes at KPI Green Energy Ltd:
An investor comes across multiple instances that indicate a scope for improvement in the internal controls and processes at the company. Let us see some of these instances.
4.1) Noncompliance with legal regulations:
On multiple occasions, the company did not comply with the regulations and as a result, was penalized by the authorities.
For example, the company did not file details of related party transactions for half year ended March 31, 2022, September 30, 2023 and March 31, 2024. As a result, the company had to pay a fine of ₹70,800 for FY2022 and ₹5,900 for FY2024.
FY2024 annual report, page 114:
delay in submitting the disclosure of Related Party Transactions…for the half year ended March 31, 2022…The Company has paid the fine of ₹70,800/– to each exchange for delay in RPT
delay in submitting the disclosure of Related Party Transactions…for the half-years ending September 30, 2023, and March 31, 2024…paid the fines of ₹5,900/- to each exchange for delay in RPT
Previously, the company gave security for the loan taken by one of its promoters’ group companies, KP Energy Ltd; however, it did not take mandatory approval from the Central Govt. for it. Subsequently, the promoter of the company had to pay a compounding fee of ₹30,000/-.
QIP for IPO, Dec. 2018, page 24:
Company had given collateral to K.P. Energy Limited…without prior approval of Central Government…a compounding fee of Rs. 30,000/- each was paid by the Managing Director, Mr. Faruk G. Patel
On other occasions, the company did not keep proper records of the payments made to micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).
FY2023 annual report, page 268:
The company has not maintained the complete records of bill to bill payment made to the vendors registered under MSMED Act,2006 and therefore the details of amount paid to such vendors during the year beyond the appointed date can not be extracted
In FY2024, the company delayed payments to MSMEs beyond the legally stipulated credit period; however, it did not provide for interest on the delayed payments, which is required under the MSMED Act.
FY2024 annual report, page 241:
creditors due for more than 45 days as on the balance sheet date are ₹365.89 lakhs (388.22 lakhs). The Company has not provided interest on the same as per the provisions of MSMED Act, 2006.
4.2) Delays in making payments of undisputed dues to govt. authorities:
Almost every year since its IPO in FY2019, the company has delayed payment of undisputed statutory dues to govt. authorities.
For example, in FY2024, the company delayed depositing TDS, TCS, GST, PF, ESIC dues etc.
FY2024 annual report, page 148:
delays in depositing the dues in respect of TDS, TCS, GST, Provident funds, ESIC and Labour Welfare Fund contributions during the year.
Similarly, the company delayed depositing undisputed dues in FY2023, FY2022, FY2021, FY2020, FY2019 as well as FY2018.
FY2018 annual report, page 6:
undisputed SGST and CGST under reverse charge mechanism and TDS under the IT Act 1961 which were outstanding for more than 6 months
4.3) Errors in the annual reports of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
On many occasions, an investor comes across errors in the annual reports of the company indicating weaknesses in the process of checker arrangements before key documents are put in the public domain.
For example, in the FY2024 annual report, while providing a breakup of its total installed capacity (445+ MW), under IPP and CPP segments, it provided different data points in different sections of the annual report.
On page 22 of the FY2024 annual report, it mentioned that it had installed 313+ MW of IPP and 132+ MW of CPP projects.


However, in the chairman’s speech on page 26 of the FY2024 annual report, it stated that it had installed 158 MW of IPP and 287 MW of CPP capacity until FY2024.


It seems that there has been some issue with respect to classifying solar projects under IPP and CPP divisions while presenting the data in the annual report. An investor may contact the company directly to understand what is the correct data of IPP and CPP projects in its portfolio.
Additionally, in other places, there are numerous typographical and spelling errors in multiple annual reports and the website of the company.
For example, in the FY2024 annual report, on page 256, the company mentioned the year “2024” in both the current year and previous year columns.


In its corporate announcement to BSE dated August 8, 2024, the company mentioned the year “2025”.


In its FY2022 annual report, on page 97, the company misspelt Business as “Buusiness”.


In the FY2014 annual report, it made multiple spelling mistakes in the sentence describing its business like spelling Development as “DEVOLOPMENT” and Solar as “SOARK”.


Similarly, while reading many other annual reports of the company, an investor routinely comes across such errors.
The company has made a mistake in spelling its name at its website in the “About Us” section (click here).


While looking at the multiple instances of data discrepancy, delays in the timely deposit of undisputed dues, and typographical and spelling errors in the public disclosures, an investor notices that there is a scope for improvement in the internal controls and processes at the company.
An investor may read the example of National Peroxide Ltd, a Wadia Group company, where there was a history of inadequate internal controls and later, a fraud came out indicating that the senior management was siphoning off the money for almost 10 years. Later on, the company fired the senior management including the managing director of the company.
An investor may read our detailed analysis of National Peroxide Ltd and the fraud due to weak internal controls in the following article: Analysis: National Peroxide Ltd
The Margin of Safety in the Market Price of KPI Green Energy Ltd:
Currently (Nov. 21, 2024), KPI Green Energy Ltd is available at a price-to-earnings (PE) ratio of about 63.4 based on consolidated earnings of the last 12 months ended Sept 30, 2024 (i.e. Oct. 2023-Sept. 2024).
We recommend that an investor read the following articles to assess the PE ratio to be paid for any stock, which considers the strength of the business model of the company as well. The strength in the business model of any company is measured by way of its self-sustainable growth rate and the free cash flow generating the ability of the company.
In the absence of any strength in the business model of the company, even a low PE ratio of the company’s stock may be a sign of a value trap where instead of being a bargain; the low valuation of the stock price may represent the poor business dynamics of the company.
Analysis Summary
Overall, KPI Green Energy Ltd has grown its business at a very fast pace of 76% year on year over the last 10 years (FY2015-FY2024). However, this fast growth has come with its own challenges. A detailed analysis of KPI Green Energy Ltd. raises several concerns and red flags that investors should be aware of.
The company operates in a highly competitive renewable energy sector where the price of electricity is determined through aggressive bidding. This lack of pricing power means the company cannot pass on increased operating costs to its customers, leading to fluctuating profit margins.
The company’s business model is highly capital-intensive, requiring significant investments in assets to generate sales. This has led to a continuous need for external funding through debt and equity dilution. The company’s business is also highly working capital intensive, with significant amounts of money blocked in inventory and receivables. This has led to a reliance on working capital debt.
As a result, over the years, KPI Green Energy Ltd has generated negative free cash flow, relying on additional debt and equity to fund its operations. This indicates that at the current pace of growth, the company’s business model is not self-sustainable.
The renewable energy sector is heavily regulated, and any adverse changes in government policies, such as the reduction of tax incentives or the imposition of new charges, can significantly impact the company’s profitability.
KPI Green Energy Ltd faces risks related to land acquisition for solar power projects, which can lead to social and regulatory challenges. Additionally, environmental regulations, such as the Supreme Court’s order to shift overhead powerlines underground to protect endangered birds, can impact operations.
Solar power generation is dependent on sunlight, making it vulnerable to seasonal variations and climatic conditions. Extended monsoons and heavy rains have previously impacted the company’s power generation.
KPI Green Energy Ltd. has engaged in numerous transactions with promoters and their companies, including purchasing land, paying royalties, and providing loans and guarantees. These transactions raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the shifting of economic benefits from public shareholders to promoters.
KPI Green Energy Ltd has shown weaknesses in internal controls, including delays in depositing statutory dues, non-compliance with legal regulations, and errors in financial reporting. These issues indicate a need for improvement in the company’s internal processes. As a result, an investor needs to do deeper due diligence before making any investment decision about the company.
Going ahead, an investor should keep a close watch on the regulatory developments in the renewable sector & land acquisition, rapid technological changes in the industry as well as the ability of the company to keep its debt levels under check. The investor should monitor all the transactions of the company with its promoters’ group entities and assess whether it is able to generate free cash flow. Any dividend payment without achieving free cash flow is similar to giving the money raised from debt or equity dilution to the shareholders as dividends.
Further recommended reading: How to Monitor Stocks in your Portfolio
These are our views on KPI Green Energy Ltd. However, investors should do their own analysis before making any investment-related decisions about the company.
You may use the following steps to analyse the company: “Selecting Top Stocks to Buy – A Step by Step Process of Finding Multibagger Stocks”
I hope it helps!
Regards,
Dr Vijay Malik
P.S.
Disclaimer
Registration status with SEBI:
I am registered with SEBI as a research analyst.
Details of financial interest in the Subject Company:
I do not own stocks of the companies mentioned above in my portfolio at the date of writing this article.